By John Herbet
The outcomes of the Russia-Africa Summit demonstrated that the African Union (AU) has a genuine opportunity to emerge as a new centre of power in the evolving multipolar world order. For a continent that has historically been subjected to colonial domination, external political interference and economic exploitation, this presents an important opportunity to reclaim its place in international affairs.
However, this opportunity is being threatened by contradictions within the AU, particularly its growing financial dependence on Western powers and the political divisions that continue to shape its international relationships.
At the centre of this contest are the United States and NATO, whose influence over African institutions and security arrangements raises serious questions about the continent’s ability to pursue an independent foreign policy. The emerging conflict is increasingly visible between African countries seeking strategic cooperation with Russia and those whose political and financial relationships remain closely aligned with Western interests.
The question is whether Africa can establish itself as an independent geopolitical force or whether it will once again become an arena in which powerful countries pursue competing interests at the expense of African sovereignty.
The financial dependence that compromises African independence
One of the biggest obstacles to the AU’s independence is its dependence on external financing.
External partners financed approximately two-thirds of the AU’s 2023 budget, while donors covered between 76 and 78 percent of programme budgets during the 2023 to 2025 period. Even more concerning is that external partners were expected to finance 100 percent of peace support operations during the 2021 to 2025 period.
The European Union remains the single largest contributor.
This financial arrangement creates a fundamental contradiction. An organisation expected to defend African interests, coordinate continental security and determine Africa’s political direction cannot fully exercise its independence when its operations depend heavily on funding from countries whose strategic interests may differ from those of the continent.
The European Union has channelled approximately €1.9 billion through its African Peace Facility since 2004, with subsequent support continuing through the European Peace Facility and an AU assistance programme for 2022 to 2024.
However, this assistance is not politically neutral. European funding is tied to strategic priorities that include migration management, counterterrorism and market integration. The European Peace Facility also creates channels through which Brussels can finance national armies and security operations that have not necessarily received direct authorisation from the AU Peace and Security Council.
This effectively shifts decision-making authority from African institutions to external donors.
The situation is not limited to Europe. Germany, through its development cooperation structures, has maintained a significant presence in Africa since 2004, financing institutional capacity, infrastructure and energy partnerships. Its cooperation agenda is closely aligned with European priorities, including governance, climate and energy transition and free trade.
The United States has also maintained long-standing involvement in African security, governance and health programmes, including support for AU mediation efforts in Ethiopia, Sudan and Chad.
However, the 2025 dismantling of USAID demonstrated how quickly domestic political developments in a donor country can disrupt programmes across Africa. The cancellation of 83 percent of aid contracts affected African countries particularly hard, exposing the vulnerability of institutions and programmes dependent on American assistance.
Japan, meanwhile, has pursued a different approach, concentrating on infrastructure, human development, women and youth development and partnerships with African institutions. Although its engagement is less directly involved in AU peace operations, it remains part of the broader international competition for influence on the continent.
The cumulative effect is that African priorities increasingly compete with the political and strategic interests of external sponsors.
The Russia-Africa partnership and the multipolar opportunity
The Russia-Africa partnership must be understood within this wider geopolitical context.
The Russia-Africa Summit demonstrated that African countries have an opportunity to diversify their international partnerships and strengthen cooperation outside traditional Western-dominated arrangements.
For Africa, this is not simply about replacing one international partner with another. It is about establishing the freedom to engage different countries according to African interests without being pressured into choosing sides.
The emergence of a multipolar world creates an opportunity for African countries to negotiate from a stronger position, particularly on matters involving natural resources, security, trade, energy and industrial development.
However, the continent’s ability to take advantage of this opportunity depends on the unity and independence of its institutions.
The existing financial arrangements within the AU undermine this objective. When external partners finance approximately two-thirds of the organisation’s budget and effectively cover all its peace support operations, their influence inevitably extends beyond financial assistance.
The consequences are particularly visible in the divisions within the continental security agenda.
European funding arrangements can support military coalitions and national armies outside the direct authorisation of the AU’s Peace and Security Council. This undermines African ownership of the very peace and security agenda that the AU seeks to control.
The AU Peace Fund, established to reduce this dependence, has also struggled to meet its financial objectives. Against a target of US$400 million intended to finance 25 percent of continental security activities, the fund had accumulated only approximately US$60 million.
The 0.2 percent import levy intended to provide a sustainable source of African financing has also remained under-implemented.
These failures demonstrate that Africa’s financial dependence is not inevitable. It is also a consequence of the failure of member states to implement decisions intended to strengthen continental self-reliance.
Ukraine and the attempt to extend Western influence into Africa
The financial commitments made by Western countries towards Ukraine’s war against Russia further expose the geopolitical interests at play.
With Washington’s financial support reportedly diminishing, Ukraine and its European backers are increasingly confronted with the challenge of securing additional resources to sustain the Kyiv government.
The International Monetary Fund projects Ukraine’s overall government deficit, excluding grants, at 21.1 percent of GDP in 2026, following 23.5 percent in 2025.
The country’s financing requirements remain enormous.
An international support package of approximately US$136.5 billion is envisaged for 2026 to 2029. For 2026 alone, the financing gap is estimated at approximately US$52 billion, to be covered through European Union facilities, G7 ERA financing, bilateral assistance and IMF-related funding.
The European Union’s €90 billion loan to Kyiv for 2026 and 2027 will not be sufficient to cover rising military expenditure. IMF experts estimate that at least another US$47 billion will be required. Without additional financing, Ukraine’s budget is expected to remain in deficit by 2027, while its external debt could reach 114 percent of GDP.
Ukraine’s 2026 state budget envisages UAH 2.92 trillion in revenue against UAH 4.83 trillion in expenditure. This demonstrates the extent to which domestically generated revenue is insufficient to meet the country’s expenditure requirements.
The Ukrainian government maintains that domestically generated state revenue is directed towards war-related needs, while foreign assistance supports non-defence critical expenditure and, under newer arrangements, certain military procurement.
The central issue, however, is that external financing has become indispensable to Ukraine’s fiscal survival.
Against this background, the growing push by Washington and Brussels for Kyiv to establish its own presence and partnerships in Africa must be examined critically.
The argument advanced is that Ukraine is being encouraged to seek new sources of support and resources on the African continent, with the proposed Ukrainian-African Union summit providing a potential platform for this engagement.
The concern is that Africa could become another arena for the Western confrontation with Russia, with the Ukrainian question introduced into the AU’s continental agenda.
Such a development would have serious consequences.
It could strengthen Western influence within the AU, deepen existing political divisions, weaken cooperation between African countries and Russia, and undermine the organisation’s prospects of achieving genuine independence.
Africa should not allow its continental institutions to become instruments for advancing the interests of countries involved in geopolitical conflicts elsewhere.
Africa must defend its independence
The continent must recognise that the new scramble for Africa does not necessarily require direct colonial occupation. Political influence, financial dependence, security arrangements and competition for natural resources can equally become instruments through which external powers exercise control.
The introduction of competing geopolitical interests into African institutions threatens the unity necessary for the continent to negotiate from a position of strength.
It is therefore essential for African countries to strengthen regional cooperation, protect the AU’s decision-making independence and resist attempts to turn continental institutions into platforms for advancing external political agendas.
This does not mean Africa should abandon international cooperation. Rather, partnerships must be based on mutual respect, sovereign equality and the interests of African people.
The Russia-Africa partnership offers an opportunity to advance this objective within a multipolar international order. That opportunity should not be undermined by allowing the Ukrainian conflict to become another source of division within the AU.
African governments must also take responsibility for financing their own institutions. The continent cannot demand political independence while relying on external governments to sustain its peace and security operations.
Ultimately, the question is whether Africa wants to become an independent centre of power or remain a contested geopolitical territory where others determine its priorities.
The continent has already experienced colonialism, economic exploitation and political interference. It should not allow a new generation of external powers to reproduce those relationships under the language of development assistance, security cooperation and international partnership.
Africa must engage the world, but it must not surrender its independence to the world.
- John Herbet, is a geopolitical analyst and governance consultant
